Mathematical Model and Framework of Physical Layer Encryption for Wireless Communications by Li, W et al.
This is a repository copy of Mathematical Model and Framework of Physical Layer 
Encryption for Wireless Communications.




Li, W, McLernon, D orcid.org/0000-0002-5163-1975, Lei, J et al. (3 more authors) (2019) 
Mathematical Model and Framework of Physical Layer Encryption for Wireless 
Communications. In: Proceedings of 2018 IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps). 
2018 IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps), 09-13 Dec 2018, Abu Dhabi, United Arab 
Emirates. IEEE . ISBN 978-1-5386-4920-6 
https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOMW.2018.8644193
© 2018 IEEE. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Proceedings of 
2018 IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps). Personal use of this material is permitted.
Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, 
including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, 
creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any





Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Mathematical Model and Framework of Physical
Layer Encryption for Wireless Communications
Wei Li1, Des McLernon2, Jing Lei1, Mounir Ghogho2,3, Syed Ali Raza Zaidi2 and Huaihai Hui2
1College of Electronic Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology,
China. Email: liwei.nudt.cn@gmail.com
2University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, U.K.
Email: d.c.mclernon@leeds.ac.uk, S.A.Zaidi@leeds.ac.uk, huihuaihai@ucas.ac.cn
3International University of Rabat, Morocco. Email: m.ghogho@leeds.ac.uk
Abstract—As a response to serious transmission security prob-
lems in wireless communications, physical layer encryption (PLE)
provides an effective security measure which is very different from
upper layer cryptography technologies. PLE can take advantage
of the effects of channel and noise and the processing objects
are complex vector signals, which are essentially different from
Boolean algebra based traditional cryptography. This paper estab-
lishes mathematical models, design frameworks and cryptographic
primitives for PLE. Two design frameworks are proposed: stream
PLE and block PLE. For stream PLE, a new 3D security
constellation mapping is derived. For block PLE, two types of sub-
transforms are defined: isometry transformations and stochastic
transformations. The proposed PLE framework has a large cipher
signal space and key space; it provides more freedom in design and
can resist known plaintext attacks and chosen-plaintext attacks.
Index Terms—Physical layer encryption, Block PLE, Stream
PLE, Isometry transformation, Stochastic transformation, PLE-
block chaining
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of wireless communication
technology, transmission security has become a very important
issue. Due to the broadcast characteristics of wireless channels,
the leakage and decipherment of wireless signal has now
become a major security issue. For the confidential commu-
nication problem, Shannon’s early paper [1] made a seminal
contribution, in which confidentiality and reliability are closely
combined. However, sophisticated modern cryptography theo-
ries recently developed are separated from the foundations of
wireless communications. On one hand, modern cryptography
considers the problem of encryption via transmission over
error-free channels. On the other hand, in communication
systems, we consider only the reliability and effectiveness
of transmission. In a practical communication system, such
as cellular communications or wireless LAN communication,
the communication physical layer and the security layer are
designed separately and do not have much overlap with each
other.
The emergence of physical layer security (PLS) breaks this
boundary. Wyner’s pioneering work took into account the
physical layer security issues in error channels [2]. We call
this information theory security. This is a completely different
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path from traditional cryptography. Following Wyner’s work,
significant research about PLS has already been carried out,
including multi-antenna beamforming [3], artificial noise tech-
niques [4], [5], [6], cooperative interference techniques [7], to
name but a few.
Physical layer encryption (PLE) is another approach that is
different from PLS. Compared with information theory secu-
rity, PLE provides a more practical and effective method. The
encryption process itself does not rely on channel conditions
and it can provide security protection when the eavesdropper’s
channel is better than the “Alice to Bob” channel. Compared
with traditional cryptography (that only considers perfect chan-
nels) it can take advantage of the effects of channel and noise
and hopefully provide stronger security. The existing literature
has adopted PLE methods in OFDM systems [8], [9], massive
MIMO systems [10], [11], IEEE 802.15.4 protocols [12] and
sparse code multiple access (SCMA) [13]. The work in [12]
considers the hardware implementation of the PLE algorithm
on ASIC and FPGA designs.
The main methods used in PLE are constellation rotation,
sub-carrier disturbance, symbol scrambling, training symbol
resequencing and so on. However, many existing PLE methods
cannot resist known-plaintext attacks (KPAs) and chosen-
plaintext attacks (CPAs). In this paper, we will consider the
PLE method which can resist both KPA and CPA.
Furthermore, existing PLE papers lack precise cryptographic
primitive definitions and rigorous proofs of security which are
very important for building PLE-based practical cryptographic
protocols. In this paper, we will concentrate on the general
mathematical model and framework of PLE, and propose
corresponding standards to measure the security of PLE. One
of the main goals of this paper is to establish cryptographic
primitives for PLE and summarize the basic design rules.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1) We will divide PLE into stream PLE and block PLE. We
will establish two general-purpose mathematical models
and define cryptographic primitives for stream PLE and
block PLE.
2) We will propose a design framework and the basic rules
of both stream and block PLE.
3) We will define the isometry transformation and the
stochastic transformation in block PLE. We will prove
that the proposed PLE frameworks can resist both KPA
and CPA.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the PLE system model and cryptography primitive.
The design framework and rules of PLE are described in
Section III. A security analysis of KPA and CPA is discussed in
Section IV. Finally in section V we present some conclusions.
Notation: XT , X∗, XHand X−1denote respectively the
transpose, conjugate, conjugate transpose and inverse of matrix
X. IN denotes the N -dimensional identity matrix. |x| denotes
the absolute value of a complex scalar x. We will use ‖·‖
to denote the Euclidean norm of a vector. Cn represents the
space of n × 1 vectors with complex elements. Cm×n and
R
m×n represent the space of all m×n matrices with complex
elements and real elements respectively. For sets A and B,
A×B = { (a, b) | a ∈ A and b ∈ B }, where × is Cartesian
product between two sets.
II. PLE SYSTEM MODEL AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC
PRIMITIVE
A. Comparison between PLE and a traditional cryptography
system
A secrecy system is defined as a set of transformations
of a message space into a cipher signal space. In traditional
cryptography the cipher signal space and the message space
are both discrete binary spaces. However, in PLE, the possible
cipher signal space is a continuous vector space.
In the traditional security system, it is assumed that the en-
cryption and decryption blocks experience an error-free equiv-
alent channel. We assume that error correction is guaranteed
by the channel encoder/decoder module. So modern cryptology
has been constructed on the premise of an effectively error free
channel. The question is, can we use channel errors to increase
the difficulty of deciphering and thus enhance security? PLE
will consider this problem and thus combine the encryption




















Fig. 1. PLE communication system model.
PLE is a computational, complex-based, security, and its
system model is shown in Fig.1. The key still needs to be
distributed in the PLE system, which differs from traditional
cryptography in that it faces a practical non error-free channel.
And its processing object also changes from a binary sequence
into a complex sequence. PLE needs to convert the binary
sequence S into a complex sequence Y according to the key
K, and then it is processed and sent across the channel by the
subsequent communication module. In fact, PLE requires the
consideration of encryption, but it also needs to consider trans-
mission efficiency and reliability issues. PLE can be thought
of as a new extension of cryptography in complex fields
and non error-free channels. Since the processing objects are
completely different from cryptography, we need to propose
new rules and we will also face new problems.
We will now provide a mathematical model and framework
of PLE, and we will divide PLE into stream PLE and block
PLE.
B. Stream PLE
Stream PLE takes a transmission symbol as a basic pro-
cessing unit and is a time-varying encryption transform. It
has the advantages of fast conversion speed and low error
propagation. The hardware implementation circuit is simpler;
the disadvantages are: low diffusion and insensitivity to inserts











Fig. 2. Stream PLE.
1) Transmitter and channel: First, a series of pseudo-
random complex sequences rn are generated from the initial
key K:
rn = P(K) = an + jbn = Ane
θn . (1)
Here, P is defined as a pseudo-random complex generation
function. The distribution of rn (where n is the symbol index)
needs to be designed by the user. It can be fixed in amplitude,
uniform in phase distribution, or evenly distributed in real and
imaginary parts. For simplification, n will later be omitted.
Definition 1. Pseudorandom complex sequence generator
(PRCSG)
Consider ξ a probability distribution on C (a complex
domain). We call a function P : K → Cn (where K is the
set of positive integers) a pseudo-random complex sequence
generator if ∀K ∈ K, P(K) = {r1, r2, r3...}, where {rn}
is a sequence of complex independent random variables which
obeys the ξ distribution.
A PRCSG is an algorithm for generating a sequence of num-
bers whose properties approximate the properties of sequences
of random numbers. The PRCSG is not truly random, because
it is completely determined by the key K. We also can use
chaos theory to design a PRCSG.
Then the encryption is done by the encryption function f ,
yn = f(sn, rn). (2)
The output encypted symbol sequence is Y = {y1, y2, ...}
whose nth element is yn (a complex number), and yn is a
function of sn and rn. Here, S = {s1, s2, ...} is a transmitted
binary sequence. For M-ary modulation, sn (the nth element
of S) is a log2M length block of binary bits whose elements
are “0” or “1”.
Now f in (2) is the PLE function that we need to design.
The design of f has two goals. One is to prevent eavesdroppers
(without K) recovering any information from Y, and the other
is to enable the legal receiver (with K) to effortlessly recover
Y. We will later discuss in detail what kinds of f are best.
Returning to Fig.1, then after the cipher signal yn passes
through the channel, the symbols received at the legal receiver
and the eavesdropper are respectively:
ZnB = HB(yn) (3)
ZnE = HE(yn) (4)
where HB(.) and HE(.) are the channel functions of Bob
and Eve, respectively. The effects of channel noise are also
included in HB(.) and HE(.).
2) Demodulation and decryption: The legal receiver Bob
needs to recover S, knowing ZnB and K. In traditional com-
munication systems, detection and decryption are two separate
processes. However in PLE, the detection and decryption
processes are combined together. We define the decryption and
demodulation algorithm as:
S˜ = D(ZB ,K) (5)
where D needs to be designed to reduce errors as much
as possible. We also need to consider the computational
complexity of D.
C. Block PLE
Unlike stream PLE, block PLE processes a large chunk
of data. Block PLE transforms large blocks of bits into
complex vector signals with fixed or probabilistic functions.
Probabilistic transformation means the output of PLE is a
random variable. This is different from traditional block cipher
with only fixed operations.
We model block PLE as a function that maps an l-bit binary
vector into an N-length complex vector according to the key
K:
S = {s1s2 . . . sl}
K
−→ Y = {Y1Y2 . . . YN} (6)
where S is a l-bit binary message block (i.e., different from
stream PLE), K is the key whose length is kl bits which also
can be consider as an integer, and Y ∈ CN×1 is the encrypted
signal. Unlike stream PLE, l here is large (for example l=128,
256 or 512).
Let F2 denote the Galois field of two elements and let F
l
2
denote the vector space of l tuples with elements in F2. We
can represent block PLE as the following mapping T :





where kl is the key length.
Note that T is also allowed to be a stochastic mapping which
is different from traditional cryptography.
We also can consider (6) as a family of operations with one
parameter, and rewrite it as
Y = TK(S).
The transformation TK is the block PLE function which we
need to design. We can see that the PLE function transforms
the l-bit string S into a complex vector Y which is different
from traditional cryptography in Shannon’s work [1]. We call
T pseudorandom if the function TK (for a randomly-chosen
key K) is indistinguishable from a function chosen uniformly
at random from the set of all functions having the same domain
and range.
Since the complex vector space is infinite, the theoretical
key space of PLE is also infinite, while in conventional
cryptography the key space is limited by the length of the
message. So, PLE can naturally resist a brute-force attack.
D. Definitions of cryptographic primitives of the PLE system
An important work is to build cryptographic primitives
for PLE. Only after PLE cryptographic primitives are well-
established can it then be used to build practical cryptographic
protocols for security systems. So we now give the definition
of PLE Cryptographic Primitives.
Definition 2. Physical layer encryption system
Message space M: the set of plaintext messages, a finite
set. All input messages S ∈M.
Cipher signal space C: the set of all possible ciphers. All
cipher signals Y ∈C.
Key space K,K′: possible encryption key set K, and possible
decryption key set K′. For the symmetric PLE, K=K′.
The encryption key K is chosen from K, and the decryption
key K′ is chosen from K′, and so K ∈ K, K′ ∈ K′.
Key generation algorithm G : HB → K×K
′.
G is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs a key pair
(K, K′) ∈ K×K′ chosen according to the channel H between
the transmitter and the receiver.
Encryption algorithm T : M ×K → C.
Channel function HB : C → Z .
H is the equivalent channel function between cipher signal
Y and received symbol ZB , ZB = HB(Y ). Z is the set of
all possible ZB , and ZB ∈ Z .
PRCNG: P : K → Cn.
K is the key set and Cn is a (n× 1) complex vector space;
for stream PLE, complex sequence {rn} = {r1, r2, ...} ∈ C
n.
Decryption algorithm D : Z ×K′ →M.
There are some differences between PLE and conventional
encryption.
1. The cipher signal space is different from conventional
encryption. Here the cipher signal space C is a complex field.
2. The decryption algorithm requirements are different.
Decoding errors are allowed in the PLE. In conventional
encryption, it must be decoded correctly. In PLE, we only
restrain the probability of the correct decryption as:
Pr(D(ZB) = S) = Pr(D(H(TK : (S))) = S) ≥ 1− δe (8)
where δe.is a given error threshold.
3. The encryption and decryption algorithms do not require
deterministic functions. We can design them as random func-
tions. In other words, the random function will give different
outputs at different times even if the input is the same. This
property can prevent many attacks such as Chosen-Plaintext
Attacks (CPA).
4. The channel function is also a random factor in this
system, due to random noise.
Finally, we can use the following formula to represent the
cryptographic primitives of the PLE system:
Block PLE:
∏
B =(G,T ,D, HB),
Stream PLE :
∏
S =(G,T ,D, HB ,P).
III. THE DESIGN FRAMEWORK AND RULES OF PLE
In this section we will be concerned with how to design
PLE and propose the framework and rules of PLE. We should
consider two aspects:
1. Reliability.
We need to ensure that the legal receiver can recover the
transmitted signal easily and correctly. PLE must be able to
counteract noise and channel effects. This requires that the
encryption function guarantees the constellation distances after
the transformation and that the superimposed channel noise is
not amplified after decryption recovery.
2. Security
We should prevent eavesdroppers from recovering infor-
mation. The encrypted signal shows confusion and diffusion,
and uses the effects of the channel and noise to increase this
confusion feature.
Reversibility and security are two different goals. When the
PLE function has the greatest reliability, its confusion tends to
decrease, so a trade-off needs to be made in the design. We
will now discuss the design methods of stream PLE and block
PLE.
A. Stream PLE Design Framework
The key module of the Stream PLE has two parts. One part
is to generate a particular distribution of a complex random
sequence based on the key K. Note that the random numbers
here are not truly random, but rather a deterministic algorithm
that can also be run at the legal receiver to obtain the same
random complex sequence as the transmitter. The generation of
pseudo-random complex numbers has been widely researched
in many other works [14].
Another part is the design of the encryption function f in
Fig. 2. In stream PLE, f is the mapping of a small number of
bits to a complex number. To measure and guide the design of
the f -function, we propose two indicators to measure reliability
and confusion. Fixing the number of transmission bits and
energy of the output signal y, we can use the following index
parameters to evaluate the encryption function f.
a) Minimum constellation distance:
d = min
(i,j)i 6=j
|f(si − sj , rn)| (9)
where si, sj ∈ M are possible input messages and d is the
minimum distance of two different messages. Note that d will
eventually affect the bit error rate of the legitimate recipient.
This indicator is similar to the constellation design indicator
in traditional communication systems. We should design f to
maximize d.
b) Distribution characteristics of the output signal:
Note that if r is truly random, then this forms a one-time
system which provides perfect security. However, in a practical
system, we cannot get a truly random r from a limited length
key. So, r is a pseudo-random complex sequence and is not
truly random. Therefore, eavesdroppers have the possibility of
obtaining information about s or r by accumulating observa-
tions for Y over a long time. In order to avoid this situation,
we need more confusion in the y-sequence, and there are more
possible values for y = a+ jb.
We use the continuous entropy to measure the confusion
degree of Y as follows:
He(Y ) = −
∞∫∫
−∞
p(a, b) log2 p(a, b)dadb, (10)
where p(a, b) is the joint probability density function for a
and b.
Since continuous entropy is infinite, it is not easy to cal-
culate the continuous entropy values. In addition, the actual
digital system will quantize the signal Y , so we will use
discrete source entropy to measure the confusion degree of
Y . A continuous Y is discretized into bins of size ∆ (we
can understand it as quantification accuracy). We thus have
quantized entropy as:





Γ (i, j) log2 Γ (i, j), (11)






We need to maximize H∆(Y ), given the domain of Y is
C. According to maximum entropy theory, Y needs to be a
uniform distribution within its given domain C [15]. This rule
means that for an arbitrary input symbol S, after the f -function
transformation, Y can be any value in the entire given domain,
and the probability of different values is equal.
We now present two approaches for the design of the
encryption function f .
(i) PLE based on traditional modulation
In transmitters, encryption transformation is performed after
the traditional constellation mapping (such as BPSK, QPSK,
16QAM, etc.), and at the receiver decryption is performed
before traditional constellation demodulation. The encryption
and decryption transformation here needs to ensure that the
constellation distance is not changed, in order to guarantee
the error rate of the legal receiver.
In the phase modulation system (QPSK, BPSK, M-PSK,
etc.), the generated θn follows the uniform distribution (θ ∼
U [0, 2pi]). The input information bits are mapped by tradi-
tional M-PSK to obtain a complex symbol Xn, and then the
following rotation processing is performed:
Yn = Xne
θn . (12)
Clearly the rotation in (12) leasves the distances between
the constellation points unaltered (in accordance with the
aforemention a) and b)). This method is used in [16] and [11].
(ii) New constellation for stream PLE
Instead of relying on existing modulation systems, the func-
tion f is totally redesigned so that the output Y is uniformly
distributed in a given space.
For example, in our previous work [17], a 3-dimensional
rotated constellation modulation was designed in which 2
bits are mapped to a 3-dimensional constellation point and
evenly distributed on a spherical surface. These 3 dimensions
in practical systems can be obtained by (for example) using
the two dimensions of one subcarrier and one dimension form
another subcarrier. For example, in an OFDM system 1.5
subcarriers can be combined to get an modulation unit.
First, each block of 2-bit data is mapped to the four
vertices of the regular tetrahedron Xn ∈ R
3. The regular
tetrahedron vertices have equal distances between them so the
best performance can be obtained. Then the three-dimensional
constellation is rotated to obtain an encrypted constellation
Yn ∈ R
3:
Yn = Xn ·R(α, β, γ) (13)
where R(α, β, γ) is the rotation matrix in (14), and α, β, γ ∼
U(0, 2pi) are random phase parameters. The distribution of
R(α, β, γ) =






 1 0 00 cosβ sinβ








Yn is shown in the Fig.3. These points are distributed on the
surface of the sphere.
Fig. 3. PLE for a 3-D constellation where constellation points lie on
the surface of the sphere with a uniform probability density function
for each of the two parametric angles
B. Block PLE design framework
Block PLE operates on fixed-length groups of bits, called
blocks, with a transformation that is specified by a symmetric
key. Different from a traditional block cipher, block PLE
converts bit blocks to complex vectors. Signals arriving at the
receiver through the channel need to be correctly demodulated.
So the rules of operation are very different from a traditional
block cipher.
We need to design block PLE methods which should have
the following properties.
(i) Confusion
Finding the relationship between the key and the cipher
signal should be as complex and as involved possible. The
key should be protected from exposure even when an attacker
has large amounts of cipher signal to analyze.
(ii) Diffusion
The statistical structure of plaintext should be dissipated
over the bulk of the cipher signal. There is no clear correspon-
dence between plaintext and the cipher signal. This property
ensures the PLE has the ability to resist differential attacks.
(iii) Noise tolerance
The cipher signal will pass through the wireless channel.
When the signal-to-noise is large, the legal receiver should
correctly recover the plaintext with a given key. In other words,
decryption at the receiver should not increase the effect of the
noise.
The framework of block PLE is shown in Fig. 4. A key
schedule is an algorithm that expands a relatively short master












Fig. 4. Block PLE.
later use in an encryption algorithm [18]. We divide the steps
of block PLE design into 3 phases: Bit Change, Modulation
and Block Change. Each stage uses different keys, which are
derived from the master key.
The bit change stage can use Boolean functions such as
interleaving, substitution, permutation, etc. [19], [20]. The
binary vector S is changed to S′ according to K1.
The modulation stage can use common modulation methods
such as BPSK, QPSK, and 16 QAM, as well as a new





2 . . . s
′
l} → X = {X1X2 . . . XN}
where {s′1s
′
2 . . . s
′
l} are binary numbers, and X ∈ C
N is the
output of the modulation. l is the bits length and N is the
symbol number. For M-ary constellation, l = N log2M .
Block change is the most important stage in PLE. Essen-
tially, it is a mapping function e in a complex vector space:
X = {X1X2 . . . XN} → Y = {Y1Y2 . . . YN} (15)
Y = e(X) (16)
whereY ∈ CN is the cipher signal vector. Here, we can design
some sub-transforms e1, e2, e3...and then combine them to
form the final encryption transform.
e(X) = e1(e2(...(en(X)))). (17)
Then, we consider what kind of functions can be used as sub-
transforms for PLE.
a) Isometry transformation: First of all, let us consider
the transformations which can guarantee the constant constel-
lation distance. We will use the definition of isometry.
Definition 3. Let X and Y be metric spaces with met-
rics dX and dY . A map f : X → Y is called an isome-
try or distance preserving if for any a,b∈X one has
dY (f(a), f(b)) = dX(a, b). (18)
Then X and Y are Euclidean spaces of the same dimension
N , and all the isometries between X and Y can be denoted
by premultiplying X with a unitary matrix U ∈ CN where
UU
H = UHU = IN . (19)
Obviously |det(U)| = 1. The columns or rows of U
form an orthonormal basis of CN with respect to the usual
inner product. In fact any N × N unitary matrix U has N2
independent real phase parameters. Thus, we can generate an
N × N unitary matrix U from a (N2 × 1) given rotation
direction vector Φ ∈ RN
2
. Φ can be generated from K3,
and both are known by both Alice and Bob. The method of
generation of an N × N unitary matrix from Φ is given in
[21].
Taking N = 2 as an example then the general expression
for an 2× 2 unitary matrix is:
U = eiφ/2
[
eiφ1 cos θ eiφ2 sin θ
−e−iφ2 sin θ e−iφ1 cos θ
]
, (20)
which depends on 4 parameters Φ = {φ, φ1, φ2, θ} , where
φ, φ1, φ2, θ ∈ [0, 2pi].
Thus ei(X) = UX (see (17) for ei(X)) can be used as a
sub-transformation. We also can extend to N > 2 to acquire
more confusion.
b) Stochastic transformation: If the eavesdropper can
obtain a large number of plaintext and cipher signal pairs,
then by only using an isometry transformation the system
is likely to be cracked. In order to solve this problem and
make the result of each encryption different, we need to
introduce some stochastic transformations. These stochastic
transformations make it impossible for an eavesdropper to
perform a known-plaintext attack and so cannot calculate the
encryption transform e from multiple accumulated Y and X
data.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE
COMPARISON
A. Security analysis for KPA and CPA
On the eavesdropper side, we need Eve to be unable to
recover S or K from ZE .
We assume that Eve has the following characteristics:
1) Eve knows the channel functions HB(.) and HE(.).
2) Eve knows the PLE function f and the decryption
function D, but does not know the secret key K.
Eve has the following attack aims:
1) Decode S from ZE without knowledge of the key
(ciphertext-only attack).
2) RecoverK form ZE with the known message S ( known-
plaintext attack).
3) Recover K form ZE without the known message S
(cipher text-only attack).
4) The enemy Eve can obtain the cipher signal for any spec-
ified plaintexts for the current key (chosen-plaintext attack).
The algorithm we design seeks to prevent these types of
Eve attacks. From (4), we can see that even with the same
transmission symbol S and the same key K, due to noise and
influence of the channel, at different transmission timings the
ZE obtained will be different. S and ZE do not show a one-to-
one correspondence, which makes eavesdropper cryptanalysis
methods such as linear attacks and differential analysis more
difficult.
In block PLE systems, when designing e(X), we need to
ensure that even if Eve accumulates some plaintext and cipher
signal pairs over a period of time, the function e(.) cannot
be inferred, and the key cannot be obtained. We consider the
worst case where the noise nE received by Eve is very small
and can be ignored. Thus in the KPA situation, we assume
that Eve can accurately obtain Y.
In the phase rotation method [12], [13], [11], each nth
symbol is encrypted separately, Un, Xn, Yn ∈ C. Thus, we
have
Yn = e(Xn) = UnXn.
If eavesdropper knows Xn and Yn, then she can solve Un =
Yn/Xn and calculate the key K from Un. So just using phase
rotation is not enough to resist KPA and CPA.
In our proposed block PLE frame, we encrypted the signal
as a group. The unitary matrix U defined in the isometry
transformation has N×N matrix elements, so that Eve cannot
solve the equation YN×1 = UN×NXN×1 to obtain U.
Moreover, U will change between different symbols. Thus,
Eve cannot obtain U by accumulating Y and X.
Note that in the stream PLE system, because rn is changing
all the time, its is obvious that KPA and CPA can be resisted
by pseudorandom complex sequence generators.
B. Performance comparison of different PLE schemes
Due to page length constraints we can only directly summa-
rize the performance of our two approaches (block PLE and
stream PLE). A more thorough and detailed description will
be presented later in a full journal paper.
In Table I we compare the performance of five different
PLE schemes: phase rotation scheme [12], [13], [11], intrinsic
interference scheme [9], sub-carrier obfuscate and dummy [8],
our isometry based block PLE scheme, and our stream PLE
framework. We consider five aspects: a) bit error ratio (BER)
penalty, BER performance reduction due to PLE algorithm; b)
throughput decrease; c) key space; d) CPA security, the ability
to prevent CPA; e) encryption and decryption complexity.
As summarized in Table I, our scheme outperforms other
PLE schemes. It is proven in the previous section that the
phase rotation scheme cannot resist CPA, because this method
encrypts symbol-by-symbol which does not obey the diffusion
rule. The intrinsic interference scheme and the dummy based
scheme use some transmission power to send imaginary sym-
bols or dummy data, so their BER or throughput performances
decrease. Note that in the subcarrier obfuscate and dummy
scheme two stream ciphers are used, so the CPA security
depends on the stream cipher it chooses. Actually, there are
known attacks on stream ciphers. Also, the CPA security of
the stream PLE framework is determined by PRCNG.
We also compared the encryption and decryption complexity
of all the schemes. The main computational complexity in the
isometry based block PLE scheme is a matrix multiplication.
Here, n is the plaintext length. It is shown that all five
PLE schemes have linear complexity that can be realized by
software or hardware implementation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper established a general mathematical model and
cryptography primitive of PLE. We divided the PLE into two
types: stream PLE and block PLE. We proposed a framework
and guidelines for designing stream PLE and block PLE. We
proposed adopting an isometry transformation in PLE and
introduced random functions to increase security against KPA
and CPA. PLE has more cipher signal space and key space
than traditional cryptography. Our proposed PLE frameworks
provide more freedom in design and can resist KPA and CPA
without any BER penalty.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT PLE SCHEMES.
BER penalty Throughput decrease Key space CPA security Complexity
Phase rotation scheme [12], [13], [11] No No High No O(n)
Intrinsic interference scheme [9] 1dB-4dB No High No O(n)
Subcarrier obfuscate and dummy [8] No α = k/(Nds)
∗ High Relies on stream cipher MO(n)
Our isometry based block PLE No No High Good O(n)
Our stream PLE framework No No High Relies on PRCNG O(n)
∗s is OFDM symbol number in one group, k is reserved subcarrier number for dummy data, and Nd is the subcarrier number [8].
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